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PREFACE
Space vehicle structures are vulnerable to the initiation
and propagation of cracks or crack-like defects during
their service life, which may lead to structural failure.
Although individual causative factors and preventive
measures have been known for some time, and have been
accounted for in the design of aerospace structures, the
advent of the Space Shuttle has emphasized the problem
due to extreme criticality of structural weight and the
requirement for reuse of the vehicle.
The term "fracture control" has recently come into use
to describe the approach to design which seeks to
prevent structural failure due to cracks or crack-like
defects.
In order to provide a basic understanding of the nature
and magnitude of the subject, it was felt desirable to
as_mble in one conci_ volume the complex and
mt,ltidiseiplinary factors that bear on the subject. It
should be noted that the elements of the subject are not
new-only the consideration of them in an overall
manner.
it was the belief that the most effective form of
presentation would be by means of succinct criteria
statements of what has to be done to assure adequate
fracture control. Most of the document consists of such
statements. Where appropriate, interpretive information
has also been added in medium type. Two references
have been used extensively in preparing this document:
Structural Design Criteria Applicable to a Space Shuttle
(NASA S1'-8057) and Fracture Control of Metallic
Pressure Vessels (NASA SP-8040).
Preliminary criteria herein are not intended to be
requirements or specifications but to serve as a beginning
point or check list for generating fracture control
requirements or for evaluating the desirability of a
fracture control approach to design.
The effort was sponsored by the Structural Design Panel
of the NASA Structures and Materials Technology
Working Group.
The work of preparing and reviewing the technical
subject material was performed on very short notice by
an ad hoc government/industry working group com-
posed of specialists in design, structures, materials,
fracture mechanics, and other related technologies.
Participating were 7 aerospace companies, 4 NASA
Centers. NASA Headquarters, and the USAF Flight
Dynamics Laboratory. This meeting was chaired by
R. W. Leonard of the NASA Langley Research Center. A
list of participants is given on page iv.
Compiling, integrating, and editing of the document
were performed by the Design Criteria Program Office of
the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company under
the direction of the Langley Re,arch Center's Struc-
tural Systems Office (SSO).
Organizations and individuals who participated in the
development of this document include:
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PRELIMINARY CRITERIA FOR THE FRACTURE CONTROL
OF SPACE SHUTTLE STRUCTURES
1. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this document is to provide preliminary
criteria for the fracture control of Space Shuttle
structures. Fracture control is a set of policies and
procedures intended to prevent structural failure due to
the initiation or propagation of cracks or crack-like
defects during fabrication, testing, and service life. The
basic objective of the proposed criteria is to ensure that
unacceptable structural failures due to crack-initiated
fractures will not occur during the service life of the
Space Shuttle. To accomplish this objective, the criteria
define the design, fabrication, environmental control,
inspection, maintenance, repair, and verification proce-
dures required for adequate fracture control.
2. SCOPE
The fracture control criteria are applicable to those
Space Shuttle components which are determined, by
engineering analysis and tests, to be (1) susceptible to
cracking or fracture on the basis of anticipated loads and
environment, and (2) critical to either crew safety or
system performance.
The failure modes which are accounted for in the
fracture control criteria include as a minimum the
growth to the point of leakage or rupture of the
following:
• Cracks initiated at existing flaws
• Cracks initiated by fatigue
• Cracks due to stress corrosion
• Cracks caused by material contamination
The criteria are not intended to apply to accidental or
inadvertent mishandling which in itself would cause
failure. The criteria define fracture control measures
covering the entire development of operational life of
the vehicle, including engineering design, material selec-
tion and procurement, fabrication processes, quality
assurance procedures, acceptance and/or periodic proof
tests, flight tests, and operational service usage. Fracture
control measures also apply to non-flight articles under-
going development and qualification tests.
All disciplines necessary to effective fracture control are
treated herein:
• Management
• Design
• Loads and environments
• Materials
• Analyses
• Fabrication process control
• Quality assurance
• Tests
• Operations and maintenance
In the remainder of this document, statements in
boldface type are design criteria and statements in
medium type provide guidance for interpretation of the
criteria.
3. MANAGEMENT
A fracture control plan shall be developed and docu-
mented by the contractor. The plan shall include
provisionsfor the following: 4. DESIGN
Identification of components selected for frac-
ture control on the basis of criticality to
structural flightworthiness and susceptibility to
cracking or fracture
Definition of organization responsibilities and
procedures for communicating and taking
action on matters relevant to fracture control
• Appropriate multidisciplinary, review
Establishment of a fracture-control data bank
that is accessible and readily available to all
interested personnel
Maintenance of a continuing quality assurance
activity directed toward identifying and report-
ing conditions which could affect the fracture
resistance of structural components, and
providing visibility to management of the per-
formance and effectiveness of fracture control
procedures.
• Appropriate review, performance appraisal, and
control by management
The fracture control plan shall treat all subjects and
disciplines which affect fracture control, including the
following as a minimum:
• Management
• Design
• Loads and environments
• Materials
• Analyses
• Fabrication process control
• Quality assurance
• Tests
• Operations and maintenance
4.1 Service Life Philosophy
Each selected component shall be evaluated to deter-
mine whether a _fe-life or a fail-safe design approach is
more appropriate. In general, the fail-safe design
approach shall be employed to the maximum extent
practicable, The evaluation shall account for the require-
ments of safety, structural weight, inspectability, main-
tainability, and replaceability as well as the cost and the
influence of environmental factors.
4.1.1 Safe-Life
For structure requiring a safe-life design, such as metallic
pressure vessels or landing gears, any flaws that cannot
be detected in a regularly scheduled inspection shall not
grow enough before the next scheduled inspection to
degrade the strength of the structure below that required
to sustain (TBI)) percent of limit load at the design
temperature for that condition. Analysis of flaw growth
shall accoun_ for material properties and their varia-
bility, _tructural concepts, and operating environments
and stress levels. The inspection procedures shall be
considered adequate only when they can readily detect
all flaws or defects equal to or greater than the allowable
sizes,
For components selected for fracture control, the
safe-life, as determined by conventional fatigue analysis
and test and assuming an initially unflawed structure,
shall be at least (-I BD) times the specified service life or
(TBD) times the inspection interval.
Components selected for fracture control shall be
designed so that verification of safe-life is not dependent
on unsubstantiated projected improvement in NDE
capabilities.
4.1.2 Fail-Safe
Fail-safe designs shall be developed to provide adequate
fracture-arrest capability and residual strength in the
damaged condition.
All fail-safe structure shall be accessible for periodic
inspection. Fail-sale design shall account for the follow-
ing factors:
• Size, type, and source of flaws
• Critical loading conditions and associated stress
levels
• Material properties
• Critical structural components
• Extent of damage which the structure can
withstand
• Applicable modes of failure
• The dynamic effect of suddenly failing
elements, and
• The concentration of load or stress on elements
adjacent to the failed element
4.1.3 Residual Strength
The residual strength of fail-safe structure shall be
adequate to withstand (TBD) percent of limit design
conditions. The residual strength of fail-safe structure is
defined as the strength remaining after failure of any
single structural element.
The residual strength of safe-life structure shall be
adequate to withstand design limit conditions through-
out its operational life. The residual strength of safe-life
structure is the strength remaining at any time during its
service life. The original strength may be reduced by
growth of flaws or by degradation of mechanical
properties due to temperature and corrosive
environments.
4.2 Fracture Control Precautions
Components selected for fracture control shall be
designed to the general criteria and guidelines in NASA
SP-8057. Fracture control precautions shall be incorpor-
ated into the detail design configuration. These precau-
tions shall include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Eccentricities and stress concentrations that
could act as fatigue-crack nucleation sites shall
be minimized
Effects of processes, geometric configurations,
and manufacturing tolerance on flaw initiation
and propagation shall be accounted for
• Strain concentrations under fabrication, test,
and operation conditions shall be minimized
Stress-corrosion cracking shall be prevented by
material selection, temper selection, or environ-
mental control
Residual stresses shall be evaluated and
accounted for in selection of manufacturing
processes and determination of assembly fit-up
The capabilities of applicable NDE techniques
for detection of critical structural defects shall
be utilized
• Adequate accessibility provisions shall be incor-
porated in the design
5. LOADS AND ENVIRONMENTS
The cumulative static and dynamic loading and thermal
and chemical environments anticipated in the various
phases of the service life shall be defined for all major
structural components or systems. The spectra shall
include all flight and ground phases as indicated in
Section 2. The load spectrum for each component or
system selected for fracture control shall be determined
by rational analysis that accounts for the following
factors and their statistical variations:
The explicitly defined model of vehicle usage
upon which the life spectrum is based, includ-
ing as a minimum conditions such as are cited
in Section 5 of NASA S1'-8057 and NASA
Environmental Specification
• The frequency of application of the various
types of loads and load levels and environments
• The environmentally induced loads
• The environments acting simultaneously with
loads with their proper phase relationships
• The prescribed service-life requirements
The references cited in Section 4.8.4 of NASA SP-8057
give recommended practices for defining load spectra.
The design spectra shall be used for both design analysis
and testing. The load-temperature spectra shall be
revised as the structural design develops and the aero-
dynamic, thermodynamic, and loads data improve in
accuracy and completeness.
In many cases it may be necessary to carry out
additional analyses to establish a more reliable predic-
tion of useful service life.
Structural data, such as accelerations, strains, and
temperatures, shall be measured and recorded for each
vehicle mission operation. The contractor's fracture
control plan shall specify the frequency with which such
data shall be used to reassess the remaining service life.
6. MATERIALS
6.1 Material Selection
Fracture properties which shall be accounted for in
material selection include: (1) fracture toughness;
(2) resistance to initiation and propagation of fatigue
and environmentally induced cracking; (3) threshold
values of stress intensity under sustained and cyclic
loading; (4)the effect of fabrication and joining pro-
cesses; (5) the effects of cleaning agents, dye penetrants,
and coatings; (6) crack propagation characteristics,
including real-time effects (e.g., time at peak load); and
(7) effects of temperature and other environmental
conditions. Wherever possible, low-toughness materials
shall be avoided.
Many high-strength materials, because of their low
toughness, are especially susceptible to serious damage
from or accidental deviation from the specified fabrica-
tion procedures. They are also highly sensitive to the
effects of apparently minor damage. For a particular
design stress level, therefore, it is often better to use a
greater portion of the strength potential of a low-
strength material rather than a smaller portion of the
strength of a high-strength material due to the greater
tolerance for flaws in the lower-strength material.
Materials and their design operating stress levels shall be
selected so that the required life for a given component
can be evaluated by available NDE techniques, by proof
test, or by a combination of the two.
An evaluation shall be performed at the time of material
selection to determine whether any unique problems or
requirements related to fracture control exist for the
material or product form. Examples include: (I) the
material's lack of fracture toughness, or its susceptibility
to stress-corrosion cracking or to variations in material
production leclmiques; and (2)the requirement for
in-process NDE to detect defects that may be obscured
in the final product tbrm.
Specific material specifications shall be prepared when
fracture control requirements are not adequately
expressed by existing government or industry specifica-
tions. Where practical, specifications shall incorporate
required minimum values for fracture toughness or other
fracture properties under prescribed test conditions, and
also shall incorporate special NDE requirements.
6.2 Material Characterization
Materials shall be selected, when possible, on the basis of
fracture properties listed in reliable sources. Widely
recognized sources include M1L-HDBK-5, ASTM Stand-
ards, MIL Specifications, and the Aerospace Structural
Metals Handb,)ok. Preference shall be given to sources
which provide data on a statistical basis. Material sources
shall be approved by NASA.
Fracture properties used in the materials selection
process and their sources shall be documented and
stored in a materials data bank. Pertinent fracture
properties measured as a part of a standardized receiving
inspection shall be compiled in the materials data bank.
When fracture properties data are missing, the contractor
shall include in his fracture control plan a list of the
sources examined and shall propose a program to obtain
the missing infornmtion.
When data sources define potential problems associated
with the application of a material, the contractor shall
include in his fracture control plan an assessment of each
problem and a proposed method to overcome it.
Test programs to determine the fracture properties of
materials shall employ initial screening tests to minimize
the need for subsequent detailed tests.
For example, screening tests can identify the most
promising tempers, conditions, and fabrication processes
of candidate materials before in-depth materials charac-
terization tests are begun.
Uniform test procedures shall be employed for deter-
mination of material fracture properties. Where possible,
these procedures shall conform to recognized standards.
Acceptable standards include the test specifications of
the American Society for Testing and Materials, specifi-
cations of the Society of Automotive Engineers, Aero-
nautical Materials Specifications, and Aeronautical
Material Documents. The test specimens and procedures
utilized shall provide valid test data for the intended
application. Test procedures shall be approved by
NASA.
7. ANALYSES
Analyses shall be performed to verify the structural
adequacy of all components selected for fracture con-
trol. Where adequate theoretical techniques do not exist
or where experimental correlation with theory is inade-
quate, the analyses shall be supplemented by tests.
The following analyses shall be performed, as applicable:
Analyses of static and dynamic loads and
thermal stresses as specified in Section 7.2 of
NASA SP-8057
• Fatigue-life analyses for unflawed structure
Predicted characteristics of critical structural
defects at the most likely locations of occur-
rence and at other critical sections.
• Analyses of flaw growth under predicted opera-
tional load environment spectra
Residual strength analyses of fail-safe structure
after the failure of a single principal element.
The dynamic release of energy during the
failure of the single principal structural element
due to the maximum spectrum load shall be
accounted for
Dynamic analyses to verify that the structure is
flutter free with the maximum tolerable crack
size (safe-life structures) or with the single
principal structural element failed (fail-safe
structures). A flutter margin of 1.0 shall be
provided on the maximum d'y'namic pressure
expected at any point along the dispersed
ascent and entry design traject .oxies and during
atmospheric flight
Risk assessment analyses to quantify the prob-
abilities of crack occurrence, crack detection,
load occurrence, and resulting probabilities of
in-flight failure
Analyses and definition of text requirements
and evaluation of test results. This includes
materials tests, structural development and
qualification tests, and proof tests
8. FABRICATION PROCESS CONTROL
Functional responsibilities and procedures shall be
established to ensure the following:
That pertinent fracture control requirements
and precautions are defined in applicable
drawings and process specifications
That all parts selected for fracture control are
clearly identified throughout the fabrication
cycle
That detail fabrication instructions properly
implemented the fracture control requirements
and special precautions and guard against
processing damage or other structural
degradation
That quality assurmlce procedures are defined
to validate in-process controls and the integrity
of the finished part. Fracture control practices
to be implemented in the preceding steps
should account for mechanical and fracture
propertiesandphysicalconditionsthatcould
contributetocrackinitiationorgrowth.
Procurementrequirementsandcontrolshallbe imple-
mented to ensure that suppliers and subcontractors
employ fracture control procedures and precautions
consistent with internal fabrication process practices.
9. QUALITY ASSURANCE
The quality assurance system applied to components
selected for fracture control shall insure that materials
and parts conform to specification requirements; that no
damage or degradation has occurred during manufacture,
processing, and operational usage; and that high con-
fidence exists that no defects are present which could
cause failure.
Appropriate inspection points and NDE techniques shall
be selected for inspection of components selected for
fracture control to verify compliance with the above,
and with other specifications pertinent to fracture
control. In choosing inspection points and techniques,
consideration should be given to material, structural
configuration, accessibility for inspection, and predicted
size, location, and characteristics of critical initial flaws.
The capability of the selected NDE techniques, under
production or operational inspection conditions, to
reliably detect critical flaws in fracture control compo-
nents shall be determined experimentally. NDE
techniques, which permit tile confidence of flaw detec-
tion to be expressed quantitatively, on a statistical basis,
are desired.
Procedures shall be established to ensure that unplanned
events which could be detrimental to the fracture
resistance of components selected for fracture control
are reported and dispositioned through the contractor's
formal material review system.
Inspection data shall be collected regarding fracture
control of material and components in an accessible
central data bank. The contractor's fracture control plan
shall specify the frequency with which these data are
assessed to evaluate trends and anomalies and to define
any required corrective action.
10. TESTS
10.1 Design-Development and Qualification
Tests
Design-development tests shall be performed to confirm
the feasibility of a design approach or manufacturing
process for fracture control. Qualification tests shall be
conducted on flight-quality hardware to demonstrate the
structural adequacy of the design.
Maximum use shall be made of the same hardware for
test purposes. For example, consideration should be
given to use of the same hardware for fatigue tests and
fail-safe (residual strength) tests.
In the planning and implementation of structural
development tests, fracture control measures shall be
accounted for. Sufficient tests shall be performed to
provide high confidence that the design will exhibit
satisfactory service life and good fracture characteristics.
For safe-life structures, tests shall be conducted to
demonstrate that undetected flaws in the structure will
not propagate to a critical size during the service life. To
confirm this demonstration, periodic inspections shall be
conducted at intervals specified in the fracture control
plan. Static structure qualification tests shall be per-
formed as described in Section 7.6.1 of NASA SP-8057
using the highest practicable level of structural assembly.
Special attention shall be given to fracture-critical
structural elements in the planning and conduct of these
tests.
Safe-life tests on flight-quality hardware shall be
performed as described in Section7.6.7.1 of NASA
SP-8057. Load and environment spectra shall be
established to provide proper loads and sequencing of
events to simulate the operational service loading
environment. Appropriate proof loads shall be included
in their proper sequence. Fracture-critical locations in
the structure shall be identified prior to start of fatigue
testing. During the test, the time of any crack initiation
in these locations shall be identified and the crack
propagation characteristics and rates shall be recorded.
Fail-safe tests on flight-quality hardware shall be per-
formed as described in Section7.6.7.2 of NASA
SP-8057. The tests shall be planned and implemented so
as to verify the effectiveness of "crack-arrest" provisions
as well as the residual strength of the structure in the
damaged condition.
10.2 Acceptance and Proof Tests
As a minimum, all pressure vessels and pressurized
compartments shall be subjected to proof test. This
includes propellant tanks, crew compartment, and gas
storage receivers. All structural components should be
reviewed to determine when a proof test should be
specified and at what point testing should be performed
in the fabrication cycle. Particular emphasis should be
given to those components designed on a safe-life
approach.
For safe-life design, if the structure is not proof-tested in
accordance with the principles of NASA SP-8040, NDE
shall provide positive assurance of the absence of flaws
greater than critical size. If the structure is proof-tested
in accordance with tile principles of NASA SP-8040,
then NDE to determine flaws greater than critical size is
desirable but not mandatory. For faiN-safe design, proof
testing in accordance with the principles of NASA
SP-8040 is inappropriate, but NDE to detect flaws is
highly desirable.
Fracture mechanics theory and test data shall be used,
where practicable and appropriate, to establish proof-
test conditions which will verify that no defects are
present which could cause catastrophic failure or leakage
during its service life. Periodic inspections shall be
performed at intervals specified in the fracture control
plan to confirm the absence of such defects.
The proof-test conditions shall account for all significant
factors which could influence service-life performance.
These factors include, but are not limited to, combined
Ioadings, repeated load cycles, acceleration effects,
sustained loadings, temperatures, thermal cycles, thermal
stresses, and atmospheric or chemical environmental
effects. When the linear elastic fracture mechanics
theory is invalid (i.e., for thin gages or stresses close to
yield), appropriate service tests shall be performed on
pre-flawed laboratory coupons which simulate the struc-
ture (e.g., thickness and heat treatment) to establish
valid proof-test conditions which permit prediction of
service-life characteristics.
For integral tankage, where conventional proof-testing
(i.e., pressure loading only) does not include all critical
flight-load conditions, a combined pressure and external
loading test shall be conducted unless it can be demon-
strated to be inadvisable on the basis of such factors as
risk, cost, weight, and schedule. For those shuttle tanks
where the predicted failure mode is clearly "failure
before leakage" at proof pressure stresses, the proce-
dures set forth in NASA SP-8040 shall be followed.
During the past decade, the concept of proof testing
based on the application of fracture mechanics theory
has been used to verify the integrity of high-pressure
bottles and pressurized propellant tanks.
The effects of thermal cycling shall be accounted for in
the assessment of the service life of shuttle structure.
The generation of flaw growth data due to thernlal
cycling may be required for tile life analysis.
For those tanks in which the predicted failure mode at
proof stress is "ie',ak before break" (i.e., most areas of
the main propellant tanks), the proof test shall be
performed at pressure levels exceeding the operational
levels by a factor of TBD.
Since adequate analytical procedures for assuring safe
life under this failure mode are not yet available,
considerable experimental work to sludy flaw growth to
leakage coupled with improved NDE capat:ilities is
necessary.
Unpressurized structurat components which have been
selected for fracture control shall be proof-tested. This
would normally involve components of structural
assemblies where allowable defect sizes are estimated to
be smaller than the inspection techniques can be
expected to detect.
In general, the maximum allowable proof-test stress shall
be. equal to the yield stress level producing 0.2%
permanent strain. As a mininmm, the proof test shall
apply pressures and/or stresses which exceed design limit
loading in critical sections of the test article. When a
proof test is conducted at a temperature different from
thecritical design condition, suitable correction shall be
made to the proof loading to account for the difference
in structural strength and fracture characteristics at the
two temperatures. Materials often exhibit a decreasing
fracture resistance with decreasing temperature.
A complete pre-proof-test inspection shall be performed
to establish the initial condition of the structure.
Post-proof-test inspection shall be mandatory for those
fracture-critical structures designed for a safe-life
approach where the proof test does not provide, by
direct demonstration, complete assurance of satisfactory
performance over the specified service life. Multiple
proof tests shall be conducted for the special situations
described in Section 4.6 of NASA SP-8040. Multiple
NDE teclmiques should be used to improve confidence
that all defects have been detected that could cause
failure during proof test or operational service.
When critical components are not accessible for post-test
inspection after complete assembly, portions of the
structure shall be proof-tested prior to assembly.
Temporary and removable fixturing may be used for
proof-testing portions of tile structure.
11. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
The contractor's fracture control plan shall define the
following:
• The required inspection intervals for all
components selected for fracture control on the
basis of crack-growth analyses and the results of
structural development and qualification tests
The required inspection intervals for all
components ,selected for fracture control which
have a safe life less than the total service life;
the required inspection interval shall be no
greater than ITBD) times the predicted safe life
The location and character of defects and
critical flaw sizes for all components scheduled
for periodic inspection. This definition should
be based on total experience gamed over the
fracture control progress, including data derived
frmn fabrication, structural development, and
slructural qualification tests
The capability of the contractor's inspection
procedures and NDE techniques to reliably
detect critical structural defects and determine
flaw size under the conditions of use for
components scheduled for periodic fracture
control inspection
The requirements for environmental condi-
tioning or control needed for corrosion protec-
tion during turn-around or storage cycles
The repair techniques for fail-safe structures
that will restore their ultimate strength
capability
The operational experience data shall be recorded and
analyzed as it is accumulated to update fracture control
information and to determine any areas that require
corrective action. Analysis shall include prediction of
remaining life and reassessment of required inspection
intervals.
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Spacecrafl Sl'dr "1racket ,. July 1970
Spacecraft Radiation [orqu0s.()ctobcr 1969
Entry Vehicle ('<mtrol_ November 1969
AcrodynaniJc 'and Rockct-t_ixhaust tlealing l)uring
Latillch alld /\',col'it. May 1969
]'ransicul Loads lr(>lll ] hrusl ]'_xcihttion. l:ebruary
1969
Slosh Suppre,><,ion. 5+1_ 1969
Buckling of 'lhin-\t,'allcd l)oubiy Curved Silells.
At.lgtlS[ lc)(_c)
Sp:.icccralt Faitli tt<qi/on Sensors, ])cceml-_er 1969
Spacecraft lt<lz,ss 1 xpcitsion Torques, l)ecember
1969
Wind Loads Duri_lg As,:cnt, Junc 1970
Effects of Structural Flexibility on Launch Vehicle
('ontrol Systems. l:et_ruary 1970
Assessnlcnt and ('onlrol of Spacecraft Magnetic
Fields, September 1970
Meteoroid t{nvirollincr, l Model 1970 (Intcrplane-
ta D , and Pianclarvl. ()ctober 1970
Solid Rockci b,,loi_r Ik'rfornlance i\nalvsis and
Prcctiction. May i tJ71
Fracture ('ontrol of Met:lille Pressure Vessc, is. May
1970
('aptivc-l:ired lc_lil_g of Solid Rocket Motors,
March 1971
Meteoroid 1)amage ,\ssc_,snlcni, May 1970
Oesign-l)evclopnwni leMing, May 1<)70
Qualification rI'OMiHg. May 1970
Acceptance l'csting. /\pril 1970
Landing Impact Attenuation for Non-Surface-
Planing Lindcrs. April 1970
Spacecraft Still Sen:,,ol:,, June ] 970
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SP-8048
SP-8049
SP-8050
SP-8051
SP-8052
SP-8053
SP-8054
SP-8055
SP-8056
SP-8057
SP-8058
SP-8059
SP-8060
SP-8061
SP-8062
SP-8063
SP-80_4
SP-8065
SP-8066
SP-8067
SP-8068
SP-gO69
SP-8070
SP-8071
SP-8072
SP-8074
(Chemical
Propulsion)
(Environment)
tStructures)
{Chemical
Propulsion)
(Chemical
Propulsion)
{Structures)
(Structures)
(Structures)
(Structures)
{Structures)
(Guidance
andControl)
(Guidance
andControl)
{Structures
(Structures
(Structures
(Structures
l ('heroical
Propulsion)
((',uidance
andControl)
{Structures)
{Environment)
{Structures)
{Environment)
(Guidance
andControl)
((;uidance
andControl)
{Structures)
(Guidance
andControl)
Liquid RocketEngineTurbopump Bearings, March
1971
The Earth's Ionosphere, March 1971
Structural Vibration Prediction, June 1970
Solid Rocket Motor Igniters. March 1971
Liquid Rocket Engine Turbopump Inducers, May
1971
Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects on Materials,
June 1970
Space Radiation Protection, June 1970
Prevention of Coupled Structure-Propulsion Insta-
bility IPogo), October 1970
Flight Separation Mechanisms, October 1970
Structural Design Criteria Applicable to a Space
Shuttle, January 1971
Spacecraft Aerodynamic Torques. January 1971
Spacecraft Attitude Control During Thrusting
Maneuvers, February 1971
Compartment Venting, November 1970
Interaction with Umbilicals and Launch Stand,
August 1970
Entry Gasdynamic Heating, January 1971
Lubrication, Friction, and Wear, June 107 I
Solid Propellant Selection and Characteristics, June
1971
Tubular Spacecraft Booms (Extendable, Reel
Stored), February 1971
Deployable Aerodynamic Deceleration Systems,
June 1971
Earth Albedo and Emitted Radiation, July Ig7l
Buckling Strength of Structural Plates. June 1971
The Planet Jupiter (1970), December 1971
Spaceborne Digital Computer Systems. March
1971
Passive Gravity-Gradient Libration Dampers, |:eb-
ruary 197 I
Acoustic Loads Generated by the Propulsion Sys-
tem. June 1971
Spacecraft Solar Cell Arrays, May _971
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SP-8077
SP-8078
SP-807t)
SP-8082
SP-8083
SP-8085
(Structures)
(Guidance
and('ontrol)
tStructures
(Structures)
(Structures)
([invironmcnt)
Transportation
1971
SpaceborneElcclronic.
1971
Structural I ntcr'<iClilm
Novcnlber 1_?71
Stress-Corrosiola ('l_ickiHg in Metals, August 1971
l)iscontinuiiy Strcsw_ in Metallic Pressure Vessels.
November 1_,_7I
The Planet M¢l't_'tIt'? (l t771 I, March 1972
and ttctndlmg Loads, September
lmagil'lg Systcms. June
wilh Control Systems.
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